In the 1970s and early 1980s, Israel saw secular Palestinian nationalism as the primary threat. The PLO was attracting international attention and presenting itself as the representative of the Palestinian people. They were organized and had a charismatic leader in Arafat who excelled at attracting attention.

The Palestinian cause became iconic, cool and found widespread international support. Many people around the world believed that real peace was finally possible. Then Israel saw a chance to apply the tactic of Divide et impera. Divide and conquer. Islamist organizations linked to Sheikh Ahmed Yassin were viewed differently.

His movement built mosques, charities, schools, clinics, and religious institutions throughout Gaza. In 1979, Israel granted legal recognition to Mujama al-Islamiya, Yassin’s organization. The calculation seemed obvious. The nationalists were dangerous. The Islamists were not. Then came the First Intifada in 1987. Years of occupation, land confiscations, military rule, arrests, shootings, and humiliation had created a generation of Palestinians who had lost faith that the status quo would ever improve.

The uprising was met with a harsh crackdown. Hundreds of Palestinians were killed. Thousands were wounded. Tens of thousands were arrested. Years later, after the Oslo accords, the Palestinians found out that a deal with Israel was always conditional on phases and that Israel was adroit in agreeing to a deal and then working towards facts on the ground in its favor. A small number of settlers were withdrawn from Gaza, but hundreds of thousands were injected into the West Bank. Israeli forces demolishing some settlements in Gaza looked dramatic on camera. A sign of Israel’s magnanimous good will. The steady process of atomizing the West Bank was a slow process that didn’t make for sensational headlines.

It was in this environment of Israel’s increasing willingness to oppress and cage Palestinians heavy handedly and to gradually steal more of their land in the West Bank that Hamas emerged. Many Palestinians were forced to conclude that neither diplomacy nor submission was ending the occupation. As the conflict deepened, Hamas transformed from a religious-social movement into an armed resistance organization. Decades later, Israeli leaders continued to see advantages in a divided Palestinian movement. The PA in the west Bank became some kind of reservation police and Hamas in Gaza was used as the scary boogeyman. While crushing Palestinian national aspirations, successive governments tolerated arrangements that allowed money from Qatar to reach Hamas-controlled Gaza.

Critics, including former Israeli officials, later argued that this helped keep Hamas in power while weakening the Palestinian Authority and reducing pressure for a political settlement. Then came October 7. History is full of leaders who believe they can manage emerging forces for strategic advantage. Israel refused to offer a clear, final, fair agreement to the Palestinians and tied any deal to all kinds of stages and conditions it could later stall the implementation of, reneg upon or turn into de facto situations that it thought would benefit Israel.

A binational state, perhaps the least bad solution of all, was never seriously considered by the Israeli mainstream, since Israel clings to the idea that Israel has to maintain a jewish majority at all times.

The lesson should be: if you try to sow discord then don’t be surprised if someone sees through your game and forces you to overplay your hand. Calling monstrous acts unleashed against a civilian population you thought you could manage and demonize ‘self-defense’ only revealed the real monster to the world.